The release of the Trump administration's 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) has prompted a fundamental question: Is America stepping back from the world? The document conspicuously abandons the core framework of "major power competition" that defined the security posture of both the prior Trump and Biden administrations. Gone are the direct labels of China as a "pacing challenge" and Russia as an "acute threat." Instead, the language shifts to managing relations and rebalancing economic ties. This significant rhetorical change suggests a recalibration, but analysts caution against interpreting it as a simple retreat.
Alan Zhang, a Research Associate at ICAS, argues that viewing this solely as a strategic retraction misses the broader picture. "It is very difficult to understand this new national security strategy through the lens that the Trump administration is truly seeking a strategic retraction," Zhang observes. He posits that it reflects a sober acknowledgment of finite resources after "almost three decades of struggling with balancing resources around the world." The U.S., he notes, has finally recognized it "cannot allocate all resources equally to address every single issue around the world." The critical follow-up, then, is where Washington is choosing to focus its power.
The NSS provides a clear answer: the Western Hemisphere. The strategy launches a stark reorientation towards America's neighborhood, forcefully reviving and expanding the Monroe Doctrine with a "Trump Corollary." It declares U.S. preeminence in the hemisphere as non-negotiable for national security and singles out three primary threats: migration, transnational crime, and crucially, the influence of China. The document explicitly calls for rolling back "adversarial outside influence," taking direct aim at Chinese investments in Latin American ports, infrastructure, and strategic assets.
This regional pivot is not just theoretical. Zhang points to tangible actions: "We have seen that the U.S. is prioritizing resources in Latin America. We see aircraft carriers in the Caribbean threatening Venezuela's independence." He connects this directly to the long game of Sino-American rivalry. Despite the softer tone in the NSS text, Zhang stresses that Washington's strategic concern persists. "The U.S. does see that as a threat as China expands its influence," he states, viewing China's inroads as "a potential threat to undermine U.S. longstanding hegemony in Latin America and in the Western Hemisphere."
Consequently, the strategy sends deeply mixed signals to Beijing. On one hand, its pledges to respect sovereignty and non-intervention mirror China's own diplomatic phrasing. It also offers a blunt critique of past U.S. engagement policy, admitting the failure of assumptions that trade would lead China to adopt a Western-led order. On the other hand, the new hemispheric doctrine, demanding China's economic exit, represents a direct and confrontational challenge.
The economic dimension of this reorientation is already in motion. Zhang believes "the economic, or we say trade decoupling, is already underway," evidenced by U.S. efforts to de-risk supply chains and pressure partners in Southeast Asia. This extends to treaties like the USMCA, where the U.S. urges Canada and Mexico to jointly counter Chinese industrial investment. However, Zhang contends that "trade decoupling is really not the most concerning part." With simpler manufacturing already relocated, the frontier of competition lies in capital and technology—the global transfer enabled by Chinese investment. "The most concerning part," he warns, is the potential for a wider "capital decoupling" should the U.S. move to block Chinese funding for factories worldwide that produce goods for its market.
Ultimately, the 2025 NSS paints a picture of strategic prioritization, not withdrawal. The U.S. appears to be consolidating its position in its own hemisphere while managing—not abandoning—global rivalries. As Zhang cautions, it is "too optimistic to suggest that the U.S. has abandoned its approach to China under the notion of strategic competition." The paramount question remains: "Is the U.S. really trying to reorient its resources for a potential long-term conflict with China? That is a very important issue to continue to watch." The new strategy may have changed the vocabulary, but the underlying contest for influence endures, merely with a refocused geographical starting point.
Reporter: Guo Zedong
Video editor: Liang Zijian
Cover: Lai Meiya
Editor: Yuan Zixiang, James Campion, Shen He, Ou Xiaoming
