The Philippines has repeatedly provoked China in recent weeks in waters around Ren'ai Jiao, where a Philippine military vessel has remained grounded since 1999. Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. has also questioned Chinese-language education in the Philippines and called for closer scrutiny of academic exchanges with China.
At the same time, Manila has called for improved ties with Beijing.
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has called for a "reset" in China-Philippines relations and urged both sides to remain calm. Philippine Ambassador to China Jaime FlorCruz has also spoken of a "new equilibrium" between the two countries.
In an interview with South, Dai Fan, deputy dean of the School of International Studies at Jinan University and director of its Philippine Studies Center, said the mixed signals reflect differing positions within the Philippine government.
"Different departments of the Philippine government may appear to be moving in the same direction, but they are not necessarily united," Dai said.
Why does the military continue to fuel tensions?
Dai said the Philippine military has an institutional interest in keeping security concerns high on the political agenda.
"By playing up national security concerns, the military may be able to secure more government resources, including increased defense spending and funding for military modernization," he said.
According to World Bank data, military expenditure in the Philippines rose from approximately $3.33 billion in 2016 to $6.12 billion in 2024—an increase of about 84%. The figure rose by approximately 19% year on year in 2024 alone.
Dai said that the rise in military expenditure should be viewed in the context of the Philippine military's increasingly prominent role in debates over China-related issues.
He also pointed to Teodoro's comments on issues ranging from the South China Sea to Chinese-language education.
"As defense secretary, he should choose his words carefully and verify the facts," Dai said. He argued that some of Teodoro's remarks appeared aimed more at stirring controversy than at addressing the issues themselves.
Dai does not see this as evidence that Marcos and the military were following a single, coordinated script. Marcos may want to improve ties with Beijing, he said, but the president cannot exercise complete control over every aspect of the country's security and foreign policy.
Different government departments, he added, have their own interests and priorities.
Why does the Philippines keep drawing in the US and its allies?
The Philippines has been strengthening security cooperation with the United States, Japan and Australia while seeking their backing for its position on the South China Sea.
Dai said the Philippines' long-standing security relationship with the US is an important factor behind Manila's tougher stance toward China. He added that the influence of the US and its allies on the Philippine military should also not be overlooked.
But Manila does not necessarily want a direct confrontation with Beijing.
"The Philippines itself does not want a major conflict with China, given the two countries' respective military capabilities" Dai said.
This tension is evident in Manila's own messaging. Marcos has repeatedly called for a "reset" with Beijing, while the defense establishment continues to take a harder line on China-related issues.
Dai viewed this less as a carefully coordinated "good cop, bad cop" strategy than as a reflection of competing interests within the Philippine government.
The Philippines wants closer security ties with the US and its allies, but it must also manage its relationship with its much larger neighbor.
Why is the Philippines so adept at portraying itself as the victim?
The strategy was on display again on July 20, when the Philippines released a video accusing the China Coast Guard of driving its personnel away without cause. Shortly afterward, China's Ministry of National Defense released footage showing the incident from the beginning to the end, directly challenging Manila's account.
Philippine maritime operations are often accompanied by journalists and camera crews and feature on-site interviews. Dai said Manila has become much more adept at using these methods to get its message across.
Dai said Manila was seeking to portray itself as the victim, both at home and abroad, in order to win sympathy and support—and ultimately gain greater leverage in the dispute.
"Over the past few years, the Philippines has become increasingly adept at communicating its message internationally," he said.
The tactic is not entirely new. Philippine journalists have accompanied maritime operations in the past. But Dai said videos, multimedia platforms and outside organizations now play a more prominent role.
Dai saw this as part of a broader change in Manila's approach to the dispute. The Philippines has not fundamentally changed its position on the South China Sea, but it has become more adept at communicating that position to international audiences.
Why does the Philippines still keep the BRP Sierra Madre at Ren'ai Jiao?
The Philippine naval vessel BRP Sierra Madre has remained grounded at Ren'ai Jiao since Manila deliberately ran it aground there in May 1999.
China has repeatedly demanded that the Philippines remove the vessel, but Manila has continued to maintain and resupply it. These operations have repeatedly led to confrontations at sea.
Ren'ai Jiao is part of China's Nansha Qundao and China has repeatedly called on the Philippines to stop what Beijing describes as acts of provocation and infringement.
The Philippines has also repeatedly cited the so-called 2016 South China Sea arbitration in support of its position.
China neither accepted the arbitration nor participated in the proceedings, which the Philippines unilaterally initiated in 2013. The tribunal issued its award in 2016.
According to a July 12 statement by China's Foreign Ministry, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to rule on territorial sovereignty or maritime delimitation. The ministry said the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not govern disputes over territorial sovereignty. It also noted that, in 2006, China had excluded disputes concerning maritime delimitation from compulsory dispute-settlement procedures under the convention.
China has consistently said that the arbitration violated basic principles of international law and disregarded relevant facts concerning the South China Sea. On that basis, Beijing considers the award illegal and "null and void," with no binding force, and says it neither accepts nor recognizes it. China also maintains that the award cannot affect its territorial sovereignty or maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.
Reporter | Yao Jingsen
Photo | CFP
